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Abstract
Within the same group as the USA and India Indonesia is one of the largest 
democracies in the world. After experiencing authoritarian rule for a few decades 
since its independence the country Ƥnally at the beginning of the twenty Ƥrst 
century managed to chart along its new direction along democratic course and 
values.  More than a decade has passed since the democratic transition begun 
yet the country still faces various constitutional dilemmas and enigmas. One of 
organs of the government which has been entrusted to transform the country 
into a democratic nation is the Constitutional Court.  The objective of this 
paper is to provide critical analyses of the role of the Constitutional Court of 
Indonesia in the process of consolidating local democracy. The scope of analysis 
is conƤned to a number of important cases heard by the court on local election 
disputes from the year 2008 to 2013. The rationale to focus on local election 
is because local government provides the second layer of government for this 
unitary country making the governance more democratic and more in touch with 
local population. The result of the study is the Constitutional Court through its 
decisions has created conducive political situation and has provided signiƤcant 
contributions in the process of consolidating local democracy. In spite of limited 
number of judges and short period of settlement to disputes brought before it 
the Court have settled all disputes regarding local elections without much delay 
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and complaint. Nevertheless there are some areas that need to be addressed 
by the court to enhance its eƥciency and eơectiveness. A few factors have 
been identiƤed to be the cause of the problems namely problem of design of 
structure of the Court, extension of the scope of authority, period of settlement, 
over-dosis of authority and the breach of code of ethics of the judges.Thus it 
is recommended that in order to perpetuate the excellent achievements of the 
court the institution need to be strengthened by addressing the problems.
Key words: consolidation of local democracy, Local Election Dispute, 
Constitutional Court
I. INTRODUCTION
Based on the experiences of countries referred “new emerging democracies”, 
it transpired that there are so many obstacles in the countries that are hampering 
eơorts to develop an eơective “rule of law”. One of the problems is the “anomia 
syndrome.” It refers to the situation in which the integrity, the impartiality, 
and the independence of the judiciary are seriously inƪuenced. Under the 
authoritarian regimes, courts are usually politically intervened by the ruling 
elite.1 In other words, in authoritarian regimes, courts are more considered as 
the attributes of the authority rather than as the attributes of justice which 
has happened in Indonesia during the era of Suharto regime.2 Authoritarian 
regimes also produce legal professionals without integrity which resulted in 
judicial corruption. Amidst the impossibilities the constitutional court managed 
to overcome the cumbersome obstacles of corruption and despotism to be the 
true savior of justice and democracy. 
Before the enactment of Election Act 2007, the Constitutional Court has 
only the authority to settle disputes over the result of election limited to election 
disputes regarding the result of election of president and vice-president, members 
of DPR (House of Representative), DPRD (Regional House of Representative) 
1 See Jimly Asshiddiqie,“Access to Justice in Emerging Democracies: The Experiences of Indonesia”, In Fort, Bertrand (Ed),Proceeding 
of Workshop on “Comparing Access to Justice in Asian and European Transitional Countries, Democratizing Access to Justice in Tran-
sitional Countries, Indonesia, 27-28 June 2005, p. 10.
2 Many political experts and constitutional law experts describe the era of Suharto regime as “bureaucratic-authoritarian regime 
which controlled every single aspect of the nation, including judicial power.
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and DPD (Regional Representaive Council). After the enactment of the Election 
Act 2007, the Constitutional Court also has authority to settle disputes of local 
election.3 Since the authority of local election disputes settlement was moved from 
the Supreme Court to the Constitutional Court, 477 cases have been registered 
with the Constitutional Court.4  The huge number of cases is an indicator that 
the people have belief in the court to deal with local election disputes. The 
eơectiveness and eƥciency of the courts, which able within 14 days with only 
9 justices to deliver results and judgments, is also a factor that make the court 
is favored by the people. The facts point to the conclusion that the court does 
have a role in consolidating local democracy in Indonesia through its decisions 
regarding local election disputes. Besides resolving the general election disputes5, 
the Constitutional Court has also authority to settle local election disputes.
Settlement of local election disputes is an important aspect of local election. 
The quality of local election disputes settlement represents the quality of the 
local election itself. The quality of local election will inƪuence the quality 
of local democracy. Its commitment to justice and fairness is manifested by 
the Court’s extension of authority from only trying and deciding disputes on 
mathematical count of the result of local election to more extensive meaning 
of result of local election including the administrative disputes and criminal 
violations.  The justices of the Constitutional Court strongly believe that they 
have to uphold justice and democracy in the process of local election, therefore 
if there are violations against democracy which inƪuence the result of local 
election, the Constitutional Court can try and decide the cases. Based on the 
scenario above it is pertinent and timely to evaluate the role of the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court in consolidating local democracy through its decisions of 
settlement disputes on local elections from 2008 to 2013.
3 Based on the Election Act 2007, the term “pilkada”(pemilihan kepala daerah or election for head of region) changed into 
“pemilukada”(pemiliha umum kepala daerah or general election for head of region). Since the term used is “pemilukada”, therefore 
“pemilukada” is part of the general election which the Constitutional Court has the authority to settle the disputes.
4 www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id, retrieved on 24 November 2012. It may be compared to judicial review cases, from 2008 to 2012, 
there were only 341 cases. This shows that the number of local election disputes registered to the Constitutional Court is much 
more than judicial review cases.
5 Article 22E (2) of the 1945 Constitution states that “General elections shall be conducted to elect the members of the House of 
Representatives, the Regional Representative Council, the President and the Vice-President, and the Regional House of Repre-
sentatives”.
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II. DISCUSSION
Brief History of the Constitutional Court of Indonesia
The idea to establish the Constitutional Court emerged during the era of 
reform.6 The reasons underpinning the consensus to set up the Constitutional 
Court could be summarized into two, namely political and legal reasons.7 
Politically the Constitutional Court is one of the checks and balances mechanisms 
established to control the state organs. Legally the Constitutional Court have 
two crucial power, Ƥrst is the power to examine the constitutionality of acts or 
legislations and the second power is to settle disputes relating to the authority 
of state organs.
The idea to review acts as a mechanism of constitutional adjudication actually 
had been debated among the founding fathers of the nation in the preparation 
of the independence of Indonesia in 1945. Muhammad Yamin was the Ƥrst 
founding father who proposed that the Supreme Court had authority to review 
acts.8 The proposal however was not accepted by the member of Independent 
Committee.9 After President Soeharto’s resignation in May 1998, Indonesia 
began to take comprehensive reform measures by putting sovereignty back to 
the hands of the people. The peak of such eơorts was a series of amendments 
to the 1945 Constitution, made during four consecutive years, namely the First 
Amendment in 1999, the Second Amendment in 2000, the Third Amendment 
in 2001, and the Fourth Amendment in 2002. The amendments produced a 
blueprint for a system of state administration which was totally diơerent from 
the previous one. Two of the fundamental principles adopted and reinforced in 
the new formulation of the 1945 Constitution were: 
(1) the principle of constitutional democracy, and 
(2) the principle of democratic rule of law or “democratische rechtsstaat”.10
6 Bambang Sutiyoso, Pembentukan Mahkamah Konstitusi sebagai Pelaku Kekuasaan Kehakiman di Indonesia, Jurnal Konstitusi MK 
RI, Volume 7 No 6,2010,  p. 27
7 Muchamad Ali Safa’at, “Peran MK Mewujudkan Prinsip Checks and Balances”, Majalah Konstitusi, 2011, p. 2.
8 See Jimly Asshiddiqie, Pokok-Pokok Hukum Tata Negara Indonesia, Jakarta:PT. Bhuana Ilmu Populer, 2007, p. 581-582.
9 Ibid, 582.
10 See Jimly Asshiddiqie, “Creating A Constitutional Court for A New Democracy”, Paper presented at Seminar held by Melbourne Law 
School, March 11 th, 2009, p. 2.
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The democratic system was reinforced by the adoption of various fundamental 
principles to ensure that sovereignty had its sources in the people and was 
administered by the people, together with the people, and for the sake of the 
people. Among those important principles is the establishment of a constitutional 
court which was adopted in the Third and Fourth Amendments made in 2001-
2002.11 Among the considerations in the establishment of the Constitutional 
Court are as follow:12
a. The state of Indonesia shall be a rule of law state which is based on 
Pancasila13 and the 1945 Constitution, aims at achieving a peaceful, order, 
clean, prosperous and just country;
b. The Constitutional Court as one of the pillar of the judiciary has an important 
role in upholding the Constitution, principle of rule of law based on its 
authority as has been stated in the 1945 Constitution; 
c. Based on article 24C (6) of the 1945 Constitution, it is needed to arrange 
the appointment and retirement of justices, court procedure and other 
regulations regarding the Constitutional Court; 
d. Based on the consideration stated in point a, b, c and to conduct article III 
of Transitional Provision of the 1945 Constitution, it is needed to enact law 
regarding Constitutional Court.
The role of the Constitutional Court in Indonesia highlights the importance 
of separation of powers which has been described as “[replacing] the executive-
heavy sharing of powers” put in place by the Pre-amendment Constitution.  The 
Constitutional Court’s judicial review power provides a check on the Legislature, 
its impeachment power provides a check on the Executive; and its decisions on 
electoral results help ensure the integrity of the democratic process.14
Undoubtedly Indonesians were inƪuenced by the advance of Ǯnew Asian 
constitutionalism’ as in the cases of Taiwan, Thailand and South Korea, which 
11 Ibid.
12 See further Contitutional Court Act 2003 and the Amendment of the Constitutional Court Act 2011.
13 Pancasila means Ƥve pillars. Pancasila is the Ƥve pillars of Indonesian state.
14 Simon Butt, The Constitutional Courts Decision in the dispute between the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission: Banishing 
Judicial Accountability? in McLeod and MacIntyre (ed ) Indonesia: Democracy and the Promise of Governance,Institute of South East 
Asian Studies, 2007,p. 178-182.
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impelled close consideration of South Korea’s Constitutional Court in particular 
as a model.15 Intense debates took place about judicial review, disenchantment 
was expressed with the judiciary in general, and Indonesian society addressed 
concertedly the problems of how to advance the reform process.16 In particular 
there was an intense debate concerning how, following the impeachment of 
President Abdurrahman Wahid in 2001, to lay down a satisfactory legal as opposed 
to political process for presidential impeachment. Commentators have indeed 
stressed the last of these issues as particularly crucial, even though in practice the 
exercise of constitutional jurisdiction has in the event been directed more towards 
the enforcement of constitutional rights than towards other, ancillary, powers.17
Undoubtedly the collapse of Suharto’s Orde Baru (ǮNew Order’) in 1998, 
together with its oppressive Ǯintegralist state’ ideology, had hastened the victory 
of arguments in favor of judicial control over government that had continued 
at some level almost since the creation of the Republic in 1945. Butt refers to 
this factor as Ǯthe fading of barriers to judicial review’ Ȃ increasingly judicial 
review proponents found themselves pushing at an opening door. Some voices, 
as in Thailand, were skeptical about constitutional reform in times of economic 
hardship, arguing, as popular discourse had it, that Ǯdemocracy and the rule of 
law cannot be eaten’. The prevailing view was, however, as in Thailand, that good 
governance reforms would provide the basis for stable economic recovery and 
social justice. These factors did not of course determine what model of court or 
judicial review should be adopted. Some preferred an independent constitutional 
court, some preferred a constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court, and others 
opposed to judicial review preferred review by the MPR (People’s Consultative 
Assembly) itself.18
15 Hendrianto, 2009, Institutional Choice and the New Indonesian Constitutional Court, in Andrew Harding and Penelope (Pip) Nicholson 
(eds), New Court in Asia, Madison: New York Routledge, 2010,p. 8.
16 Timothy Lindseyand Mas Achmad Santosa, “The Trajectory of Law Reform in Indonesia: a Short Overview of Legal Systems and 
Change in Indonesia”, 2008,p. 32.
17 See Timothy Lindsey and Simon Butt, “Economic Reform when the Constitution Matters: Indonesia’s Constitutional Court and 
Article 33”, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 2008, p. 239.
18 Simon Butt, “Judicial Review in Indonesia: Between Civil Law and Accountability? A Study of Constitutional Court Decisions”, 
University of Melbourne PhD thesis, 2006 (unpublished); Fenwick, S (2008), ‘Administrative Law and Judicial Review in Indonesia: 
the Search for Accountability’, in Ginsburg, T and Chen, Albert HY (Ed), Administrative Law and Governance in Asia, Routledge, 
2008,p. 153.
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Consolidation of Democracy 
The working deƤnitions of a consolidated democracy are as follows:19
1. Behaviorally, a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated when no 
signiƤcant national, social, economic, political, or institutional actors spend 
signiƤcant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a 
non-democratic regime or turning to violence or foreign intervention to 
secede from the state.
2. Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of 
public opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions 
are the most appropriate way to govern collective life in a society such as 
theirs and when the support for anti-system alternatives is quite small or 
more or less isolated from the pro-democratic forces.
3. Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and 
non-governmental forces alike, throughout the territory of the state, become 
subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of conƪict within the speciƤc 
laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process.20
Morlino deƤnes democratic consolidation as the process of establishing and 
adapting democratic structures and norms that come to be accepted as legitimate 
by the civil society, in part or in full. He further adds that it is variegated and 
composite process which unfolds in various directions and ends by strengthening 
those institutions and norms so as to ensure their persistence.21 Ethier formulates 
two conditions for the emergence and consolidation of democracy, namely, Ƥrst, 
there should be compromise between the dominant actors and social groups. 
This compromises centers on the deƤnition of collective objectives of power and 
the modalities of participation in the decision-making process. Second, there 
should be development of social consensus.22 Important elements of democratic 
19 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South Africa and Post-Communist 
Europe, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, p. 6.
20 Ibid.
21 Leonardo Morlino, ǣƤ, in Geoơrey Pridham (ed), Transition to Democracy, Dartmouth 
Publishing, 1995, p. 574-575.
22 See Diane Ethier, Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, Latin America and Southeast Asia, The Macmillan Press 
LTD, 1990, at 13. Ethier proposes these conditions based on the experience of Southern Europe and Latin America. He explains 
in his article that the prospects for consolidation of the new democratic regimes appear rather gloomy due to the fragility and 
the limits of the social consensus. See further Ibid, p. 17.
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consolidation as described by various scholars have been summarized in the 
table below.
Table1
Elements of Democratic Transition and
Democratic Consolidation
Steps of Democracy Elements of Each Step
Democratic Transition
Linz and Stepan
A suƥcient agreement has been reached about 
political procedures to produce an elected 
government
The government comes to power that is the direct 
result of a free and popular vote
The government de facto has the authority to 
generate new policies,
The executive, legislative and judicial power 
generated by the new democracy does not have to 
share power with other bodies de jure
Democratic Consolidation
Linz and Stepan, Schneider 
and Schmitter
No signiƤcant national, social, economic, political, 
or institutional actors spend signiƤcant resources 
attempting to achieve their objectives by creating 
a non-democratic regime or turning to violence or 
foreign intervention to secede from the state.
A strong majority of public opinion holds the 
belief that democratic procedures and institutions 
are the most appropriate way to govern collective 
life in a society
Linz and Stepan, Stephen 
Hanson, Schneider and 
Schmitter
The governmental and non-governmental forces 
alike, throughout the territory of the state, become 
subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of 
conƪict within the speciƤc laws, procedures, and 
institutions sanctioned by the new democratic 
process
Samuel Huntington It has achieved what is called as “two turnover 
tests”.  In other words, the process of democratic 
power transition has happened twice transition 
peacefully and sustainably
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Morlino The process of establishing and adapting 
democratic structures and norms  comes to be 
accepted as legitimate by the civil society, in part 
or in full
Schneider and Schmitter Access to mass media
Schneider and Schmitter Whether electoral volatility has diminished 
signiƤcantly
Ethier Compromise between the dominant actors 
and social groups and development of a social 
consensus
The Constitutional Court, Local Election and Consolidation of Democracy
The Constitutional Court had been mandated to settle local election disputes. 
The decision to grant the court with such power was inƪuenced by some landmark 
of local election disputes which had been settled by the Supreme Court i.e local 
election dispute in Depok, Sulawesi Selatan dan Maluku Utara. These cases have 
been prompted by controversies caused by unclear decision of the Supreme 
Court in settling disputes of local election. Public untrust to the record of the 
general court under supervision of the Supreme Court also inƪuenced negative 
response of political parties and intellectual to the quality of decision made by 
the Supreme Court. By the enactment of Election Act 2007, the authority of 
local election disputes settlement was moved from the Supreme Court to the 
Constitutional Court. In article 1 paragraph 4 of Election Act 2007, it is stated 
that local election for the head of regions is part of direct general election for 
electing the head of the regions in unitary state of Indonesia which is based 
on Pancasila and 1945 Constitution. In other words, since the local election 
had been considered as part of the general election, therefore the authority of 
disputes settlement becomes the duty of the Constitutional Court.
The Constitutional Court has been perceived as holding the beacon for 
democracy and has become a new hope of citizens in Indonesia due to its 
reputable decisions. The court is regarded as one of true reformist state organs 
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in Indonesia. In a relatively very short period of time the Constitutional Court 
has started giving full and serious attention to the plight and complaints of the 
citizen and simultaneously gained public trust at a very high pace. As result, 
many parties summoned for moving the authority of local election disputes 
settlement from the Supreme Court to the Constitutional Court.
Selected Landmark Cases on Local Election Dispute by the Constitutional 
Court
Since 2008, the Constitutional Court has received, tried and decided 452 
cases on local election disputes.  Among the cases, 46 cases were accepted wholly 
or partly, 293 rejected, 99 could not be accepted, and 14 cases were withdrawn 
by the applicant. There are some landmarks of the decision on local election 
disputes that are important to be noted in this discussion. They are as follows:23
a. Dispute over the Result of Local Election in East Java Province: Decision 
No. 41/PHPU.D-VI/2008
It is considered as the Ƥrst landmark decision as well as the milestone case 
of local election disputes. The Constitutional Court has shifted the meaning 
of local election disputes from formal justice approach to substantive justice 
approach. Through this decision, the Constitutional Court extended a new 
deƤnition of local election disputes stating that the Constitutional Court 
does not merely try and decide the disputes based on ’mathematical count’ 
or the result of local election in term of vote recapitulation, but more than 
that also try and decide whether there is violations of law in the process of 
local election. Hence, the Constitutional Court formulates a new standard 
of local disputes that the violation of local election has to be systematic, 
structured, and massive.24 The Constitutional Court argues that to arrive 
at conclusion which convinces the justices that there are violations of law 
in a very extensive scope as well as in a very serious degree, the Court will 
decide the disputes based on evidence in the trial. 
23 See Data on Research conducted by researchers of the Constitutional Court (Helmi Kasim, Syukri Asy’ari, Meyrinda R. Hilipito 
dan Rio Tri Juli Putranto) with title“Kompatibilitas Metode Pembuktian dan Penafsiran Hakim Konstitusi dalam Putusan-Putusan 
tentang Perselisihan Hasil Pemilihan Umum Kepala Daerah dan Wakil Kepala Daerah”.
24 Widodo Ekatjahjana, “Telaah Kritik atas Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi dalam Perkara Perselisihan Hasil Pemilukada Provinsi Jawa 
Timur”, Vol. 8, No.1, Februari 2011, Jurnal Konstitusi, p. 54.
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Based on the all evidence in the trial, the Constitutional Court believed 
that there were serious violations of laws which inƪuenced the result of 
local election for every candidate. However, the Constitutionl Court had a 
constraint that they had limitation of authority in handling local election 
disputes since the laws give mandate only for the dispute settlement on 
the result of recapitulation of votes.25 In fact, the settlement of disputes in 
the process of local election, either administrative or criminal violations, 
could not work eơectively. Therefore, the parties applied the disputes to 
the Constitutional Court. 
In line with that, the Constitutional Court argues they would not tolerate 
the violations which are against article 18 (4) and article 22E (1) of the 1945 
Constitution. Using extensive interpretation method relating to its authority 
to settle the local election disputes, the Constitutional Court decided 
that the Court did not merely try and decide the disputes on the basis of 
mathematical count, but also on the basis of any systematic, structured and 
massive violations in the process of local elections which inƪuenced the 
result of the local election. 
In East Java local election, the Constitutional Court then nulliƤed the 
result of local election and asked for re-election in particular regions.26 In this 
decision, the Constitutional Court used purposive interpretation in analyzing 
and deciding the case. The Constitutional Court argues that local election 
was one of the implementation of principle of democracy in accordance 
with the 1945 Constitution. The violations of law in the process of local 
election could threaten the values of democracy as well as the principle of 
rule of law. Therefore, the Constitutional Court asked for re-election in three 
regions, namely Bangkalan, Sampang and Pamekasan. 
In short, through its decision, the Constitutional Court has interpreted 
its authority while at the same time ignoring procedural law applied in the 
Constitutional Court.  This can be accepted in the light of seeking for the 
fair election disputes settlement. The procedural law is set out for perceiving 
25 Article 106 (2) of Local Government Act 2004, as amended by Law No. 12 of 2008.
26 Article 77 (3) of the Constitutional Court Act 2008, and Article 15 (3) of the Constitutional Court Regulation 2008.
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justice, not for defeating justice.27 In other words, the judges argue that the 
Court may interpret extensively the meaning of violations of local election 
disputes in the light of securing the working of local democracy in the 
regions. The Court is the guardian of the Constitution and democracy.
b. Local Election in South Bengkulu District: Decision no 57/PHPU.D-
VII/2008 
The Constitutional Court decided that winner in the second round of 
local election, Dirwan Mahmud, did not fulƤll the administrative requirements 
of being candidate of the region since he had been in jail for murder case. 
Article 58 of Regional Government Act 2004 clearly states that one of 
the requirements of being a candidate is the candidate for local election 
has to be a person who was never sentenced by the court for any crimes 
with minimum punishment 5 years or more.28 Since the candidate Dirwan 
Mahmud did not fulƤll the administrative requirement as a candidate the 
local election in South Bengkulu was not legally valid. The Constitutional 
Court further stated that the local election in South Bengkulu had violated 
the law and the principles of election. 
Even though it was administrative dispute, the Constitutional Court, 
as previous decision in East Java, argued that the violation of law and 
the principle of election could not be tolerated because it threatened the 
principles of fair election.  Again, the Constitutional Court uses the extensive 
interpretation of its authority in this case. The Constitutional Court might 
try and decide any cases which were considered as the violation of law and 
principle of election in the process as well as the result of local election. 
The decision of the Constitutional Court has caused several critical 
responses since the decision of the Constitutional Court was only based on 
administrative reason and hypothetical assumption on the result of the local 
election.29 The decision was considered as the broadening of the authority 
27 YM. Lady Justice Constance K. Byamugisha, Justice of the Court of Appeal of Uganda,Administering Justice without Undue Regard 
to the Technicalities, Greenwatch, 2003, p. 6.
28 As amended by Local Government Act 2008.
29 TauƤqurrohman Syahuri, “Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Tentang Perselisihan Hasil Penghitungan Suara Pemilihan Umum Ber-
dasarkan Undang-Undang No. 24 Tahun 2003”,Jurnal Konstitusi PKK-FH Universitas Bengkulu, Vol. II No. 1, 2009, p. 17.
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of the Constitutional Court in guarding the working of democracy in the 
local election. Quoting Van Vollenhoven statement,” the Constitutional Court 
chose to ƪy freely without paying attention to the administrative law”. The 
Constitutional Court had extensively covered all types of violation of local 
election although the violations of election are categorized into three types 
which subject to diơerent regime of law. It is generally understood that the 
criminal violation is the authority of general court30, administrative disputes 
are the authority of KPU (Election Committee) and Bawaslu (Election 
Supervisory Board)31, and disputes over the result of election is the domain 
of the Constitutional Court32. In other words, the Constitutional Court has 
ignored the regulation of the election in the name of preserving democracy.33 
In fact, through its decision, the Court may settle the dispute on local 
election in Bengkulu Selatan.
c. Intermediate Decision on Local Election of District of Bangli
The impact of the decision on the local election in East Java is that there 
was a broader interpretation of local election disputes. The disputes are not 
only the disputes over the result of local election, but also the disputes on 
administrative issues as well as the criminal violations in the process of local 
election. The Constitutional Court emphasizes that the violations should 
be systematic, structured and massive which were considered inƪuence the 
result of local election. 
If compared to the decision of local election in East Java which decided 
to ask re-voting without any intermediate decision, the Constitutional Court 
decided the local election dispute in District of Bangli with intermediate 
decision. Intermediate decision is an interval decision (tussenvonnis) which 
has many functions before the Ƥnal decision for the main dispute. The 
intermediate decision can be any actions for preparation of Ƥnal decision. 
The decision can be also the judges asking the parties to provide particular 
evidence, shifting burden of proof, re-voting and re-recapitulation of votes and 
30 Article 252 of Law No. 10 of 2008.
31 Article 248-249 of Law No. 10 of 2008.
32 Article 259 (1) of Law No. 10 of 2008.
33 Ibid, p. 18.
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any valid evidence which determine the result of election related parties.34 In 
Bangli District case, it was proven in the trial that in 12 Vote Counters, the 
voters did not directly vote, but they were represented by others. Therefore, 
the Constitutional Court had no choice than it has to enforce the law in a 
democratic event for upholding the principles of state based on rule of law 
by asking re-voting.
The lesson learnt from the experience of the local election in East Java is 
that the Constitutional Court does not want to decide directly Ƥnal decison, 
but they ask for re-voting through intermediate decision. The Constitutional 
Court uses interpretation stare decisis and doctrinal analysis to argue that 
they have authority to try  and decide any cases related to not only the result 
of election in term of mathematical count, but also may have authority to 
settle any cases dealings with the process of local election in Bangli District. 
In addition, the nomenclature of intermediate decision is not only meant 
re-recapitulation, but also can be re-voting.35 In other words, the Constitutional 
Court has used an extensive interpretation and free interpretation at the 
same time. 
Intermediate decision is explicitly recognized in case of disputes on 
authority among state organs.36 Therefore there is no regulation on the 
intermediate decision in local election disputes settlement. However, the 
Constitutional Court as the interpreter of the Constitution may interpret 
any issues relating to the Constitution. In addition, the independence 
and impartiality of the judiciary may lead the judiciary to have authority 
to interpret based on their own interpretation in responding the existing 
case.37 Accordingly, based on the previous reasons, the Constitutional Court 
introduces re-voting through nomenclature of intermediate decision in the 
light of guaranteeing the principles of democracy as well as fair election. 
34 Maruarar Siahaan, “Implementasi Putusan No.27/PHPU.D-VII/2010 Tentang Perselisihan Hasil Pemilihan Umum Kepala Daerah 
Kabupaten Lamongan Provinsi Jawa Timur Tahun 2010”, Jurnal Konstitusi, Volume 8 No 1, 2011, at 9.
35 Article 8 ayat (4) PMK 15/2008 states that, “for the need of investigation, the Constitutional Court may decide an intermediate 
decision with re-voting.
36 Article 63 of the Constitutional Court Act also states that, “the Constitutional Court could issue a decree which commands the 
parties to stop the practice of the dispute authority temporarily until the Constitutional Court Ƥnally decides”.
37 Rahayu Prasetianingsih, “Penafsiran Konstitusi oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi Menuju Keadilan Substantif”,Jurnal Konstitusi PKK 
Universitas Padjajaran, Volume III No 1, 2011, p. 8. 
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d. Decision on DisualiƤcation and Decree on One of the Candidate of 
the Local Election in District of Kotawaringin Barat
The lesson learnt from the decision of local election in East Java also 
inƪuenced the local election disputes decision in Kotawaringin Barat where 
the Constitutional Court has produced a new norm of violations of the local 
election. In this decision, the Constitutional Court formulated the violations 
should be systematic, structured and massive.
In this decision, the Constitutional Court disqualified one of the 
candidates in the local election in Kotawaringin Barat and decided the winner 
of the local election. The reason of the Constitutional Court was the evidence 
showed that there were serious violations of election law in the process of 
local election in Kotawaringin Barat. The Constitutional Court argued that 
they have authority to disqualify the candidate since the candidate had 
violated the laws and therefore also threatened the quality of democracy.
However, some experts questioned on decision of the Constitutional 
Court since the Constitutional Court had extended their own authority in 
relation to the settlement of the local election. They proposed to revise the 
local election acts in order to guarantee the certainty of law.38
On the other hand, other experts have diơerent comments that the 
decision of the Constitutional Court on local election dispute in Kotawaringin 
Barat is a proper decision since there are serious violations of principles of 
fair local election. The violation of local election acts will create a negative 
impact of democracy.39
The Constitutional Court uses a more philosophical approach of law as 
practiced in the Constitutional Court of Germany as well as the Supreme 
Court of the United State of America. They state that if there are two options 
whether we have to choose the rule of positive law or justice, they emphasize: 
38 MK Merampas Kewenangan KPU dan PTUN, <http://www.mediaindonesia.com/2010/08/06/160511/16/1/> , See also Noorwahidah, 
“Sengketa Pemilukada Kotawaringin Barat (Analisis Terhadap Putusan MK No. 45/PHPU.D-VII/2010 dari Perspektif Hukum Negara 
dan Hukum Islam)”, Vol. 8  No.1, (2011),  Jurnal Konstitusi  at 27. See MK Buat Tafsir Sepihak Dugaan Pidana Pemilukada,Media 
Indonesia, 19 July 2010, p. 2, kolom1-4.
39 ”Saksi Ahli Dukung Putusan MK Kasus Kobar”, <http://www.jpnn.com/index.php?mib=berita.detail&id=68858>, viewed on 27 July 
2010.
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“Preference should be given to the rule of positive law, supported as it is by 
due enactment and state power, even when the rule is unjust and contrary 
to the general welfare, unless, the violation of justice reaches so intolerable 
a degree that the rule becomes in eơect “lawless law” and must therefore 
yield to justice.”40 Again, through its decision, the Court has secured the 
quality of local democracy in Kotawaringin.
e. Decision on Re-Voting with Additional Candidate of Local Election in 
Jayapura
In this decision, the Constitutional Court extended the qualiƤcation of 
the parties who might have legal standing in local election disputes. The 
Constitutional Court gave opportunity to the candidates who had registered 
but they were not determined as the candidate by the Election Commission. 
The extension of legal standing is formulated by the Constitutional Court 
on the basis of reasons which may violate the norm of the constitution, 
legal sovereignty (nomocracy), people sovereignty (democracy), any violation 
of preventing someone from being the candidate (right to be candidate), 
ignorance of the general court and impartiality of persons relating to a 
particular candidate and there it prevent other right of candidate. 
The Constitutional Court considered that there were modus conducted 
by the Regional Election Commission which prevented particular candidate. 
Therefore, the Constitutional Court has to create “a break through” to protect 
the right of someone to be candidate.
The decision of the Constitutional Court might be a warning for 
commissioners of the KPUD to be more professional and work in line with 
the regulation.41 The Constitutional Court also argued that the action taken 
by the Election Commission which prevents a person to be candidate in 
the local election is part of violations on the constitutional rights of the 
candidate. This decision also secures the process of the local election in 
Jayapura and therefore it saves the practice of local democracy.
40 See Maruarar Siahaan, n. 35,p. 1.
41 Daniel B. Ratu, ”Pemilukada Lembata Pasca Putusan PTUN Kupang”, <http://danyratu.blogspot.com/2011/04/mk-berkan-legal-
standing-bagi-bakal.html>viewed on March, 4th, 2014.
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f. Decision on Re-Voting with Order to the Election Commission to Verify 
the Candidate in District of Pati. 
The decision of the Constitutional Court No. 82/PHPU.D-IX/2011 has 
nulliƤed some decisions of the KPUD Pati such as decision of candidate, 
proceedings of recapitulation of votes and decision on the second round 
of local election in District of Pati. The decision, a quo, the Constitutional 
Court also disqualiƤed the candidate Sunarwi-Tejo Pramono and at the 
same time asked the KPUD to verify the candidate Imam Suroso-Sujoko 
to replace the position of Sunarwo-Tejo Pramono and asked the KPUD to 
re-announce the candidates. 
In the decision a quo, the Constitutional Court also asked the KPUD 
Pati to hold re-voting in the local election of District of Pati in 2011 and 
asked also the KPU, Bawaslu (Election Supervisory Board), KPU Central Java 
and Panwaslu (Election Supervisory Committee) of Pati to supervise the 
re-voting program in accordance with their authority. Through its decision, 
the Court has protect the right of the candidate in the local election of Pati 
in 2011. This also improved the quality of the local democracy.
g. Decision on the Administrative and Factual Verification of the 
Candidate and Re-Voting in District of Buton
On 21 September 2011,the Constitutional Court had decided some 
decisions on the local election disputes in District of Buton.42 Based on these 
decisions, the Constitutional Court asked the KPUD to hold administrative 
and factual veriƤcation and also re-voting in the local election of District of 
Buton. This is one of the phenomenal decisions since the decision has given an 
opportunity for the candidate to join the administrative and factual veriƤcation.
The Constitutional Court hold again the trial for the local election disputes 
settlement in Buton since there was a report that Regent of the District of 
Buton tries to prevent the re-voting as ordered by the Constitutional Court. 
The Regent did not want to provide budget for the re-voting of the local 
election in District of Buton in 2011.
42 See Decision No. 91/PHPU.D-IX/2011, Decision No. 92/PHPU.D-IX/2011 and Decision No. 93/PHPU.D-IX/2011.
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The decision of the Constitutional Court has protected the right of the 
candidate in the local election. The decision has also given a signiƤcant 
contribution to the consolidation of local democracy in Buton.
h. Decision on the Local Election of the Mayor and Vice-Mayor in the 
Municipality of Pekanbaru
The Constitutional Court had decided the local election in Pekanbaru 
has violated the principle of fair election since in the process of election 
one of the candidates has conducted violations of laws which were in fact 
systematic, structured and massive. In the evident session, it was proved that 
there was mobilization of voters from outside of Pekanbaru, mass mutation 
of oƥcers in a particular public oƥce which related to the political support 
in the local election. In addition, there was decision of the mayor which 
gave advantage for one of the candidate.  
According to the Constitutional Court, public oƥcers at particular oƥces 
had been involved systematically, structurally and massively in the campaign 
program of one of the candidate.  This was obviously against the principle 
of election which should be direct, general, honest and fair. 
The Constitutional Court argued that the candidate, Firdaus, did not 
violate the election regulation due to incompletion of his document regarding 
his wives. It was because the form of application from the KPUD which 
provides only for one wife. Therefore, the Constitutional Court further argued 
that it was not a legal issue. 
The Local election in Pekanbaru was one of dramatic local election 
since there were a long competition among the candidates through re-voting 
of the election based on the Constitutional Court decision. The Court has 
Ƥnally settled the disputes and secured the practice of the local democracy 
in Pekanbaru.
From the above landmark of decisions of the Constitutional Court, it 
is obvious that the violations of laws in the local election related to the 
violations of law in the process of the local elections, not the result of 
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the local election. In short, by extending the object of authority of the 
Constitutional Court in the local election disputes, the Constitutional Court 
is not only as “the calculator court”, but also try and decide any violations 
in the process of local elections. However, this extensive authority in the 
local election dispute settlement has led the Constitutional Court to have 
very long and heavy trials.  
From 2008 to 2013, the Constitutional Court has also settled many 
local election disputes. Eventhough some petitioners may be dissappointed 
on the decision, they accept the decisions of the Constitutional Court. By 
having these achievements, the Constitutional Court has created a more 
conducive political situation in the process of local election and after the 
local elections. This is believed to be a part of signiƤcant contribution of 
the Constitutional Court in consolidating democracy at local level. Despite 
having some signiƤcant achievements, the Constitutional Court also faced 
problems in settling disputes concerning the result of local elections as 
elaborated below.
Critical Assessment of the Court and Suggestions for Improvement
1. Design/ Structure
The Ƥrst issue relates to the design or structure.The Constitutional Court of 
Indonesia is a centralized model based on the Kelsenian model which is mostly 
applied in European countries. The Constitutional Court is located at Jakarta, 
the capital city of Indonesia. The Constitutional Court consists of nine justices, 
three justices are appointed by the President, three justices are appointed by 
the Supreme Court and three justices are proposed by the DPR. This kind of 
appointment of justices in the Constitutional Court is a part of the checks and 
balances mechanism in order to prevent the Constitutional Court from being 
dominated by one organ in the Indonesian constitutional system.
The eơectiveness of the local election disputes settlement also uses two 
approaches namely Ƥrst, the position of the Constitutional Court as the judicial 
organ which has main function as “the guardian of the constitution” through 
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judicial review mechanism”. Second, the eơectiveness can also be assessed from 
the opportunity of the citizen to access the court and also access to justice.43
Centralized model of the Constitutional Court may not be problem with 
continental European countries which are not huge countries like Austria, 
Germany, Spain or other Asian countries like South Korea and Thailand.44 In those 
countries, the parties do not need to go far away and spend a lot of money for 
bringing the cases to the Constitutional Court in the capital city of the countries. 
However, the centralized model of the Constitutional Court can create 
problems with countries with huge territory and moreover Icelandic countries 
like Indonesia.  In term of the access to justice, the furthest island and provinces 
in Indonesia will face a problem of time and cost needed to apply local election 
disputes in the Constitutional Court in Jakarta. Aceh and North Sumatera in the 
western Indonesia and Papua and Papua Barat in the eastern Indonesia can be 
some examples. Of course, it will spend a lot of money to cover the expenses 
needed in the Constitutional Court. Furthermore, the parties have to bring many 
witnesses to testify for the case before the Constitutional Court.45
2. Scope of Authority
Second issue is regarding the scope of authority of the Court. As a new state 
organ, the Constitutional Court has strived to the extent possible to implement 
the authorities and obligation mandated by the 1945 Constitution and stipulated 
in the Law Number 24 of the Year 2003 regarding the Constitutional Court 
(amended by the Law Number 8 of 2011). The Constitutional Court has four 
authorities and one obligation in accordance with those mandated by article 
24C paragraphs (1) and (2) of the 1945 Constitution. Four authorities of the 
Constitutional Court are examining at the Ƥrst and the Ƥnal level whose decision 
is Ƥnal materially review the law against the Constitution, decide disputes over 
43 See further Jimly Asshiddiqie, The Constitutional Law of Indonesia, Sweet and Maxwell Asia, 2009, at 610. In this book, Jimly explains 
that there are four goals of the general election, namely; Ƥrst, to facilitate the possibility of regular, peaceful rotation of leader in 
the country. Second, to elect representatives of the people who represent the interest of people in the House of Representatives. 
Third, to implement the principle of people’s sovereignty, and fourth, to guarantee the protection of human rights.
44 As comparison, it can be seen that the width of Austria 83,871 km2 with 8,4 million of population and with continent geogra-
phy. Germany: width 357.021 km2, population 82 million, and characteristic of geography: continent. Spain: width 504.782 km2, 
population 45 and characteristic of geography: continent. South Korea: width 99.274 km2, population 49 and characteristic of 
geography: continent. Thailand: width 514,000 km2, population 65 million and characteristic of geography: continent. Indonesia: 
width 5.193.250 km2, population 230 million and characteristic of geography: archipelago.
45 Based on data at the Constitutional Court, the applicant, on average, proposed many witnesses.
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the authority of state institution whose authority is granted by the Constitution, 
decide the dissolution of political party, and decide dispute over the result of 
general election. Whereas the obligation of the Constitutional Court is providing 
decision over the opinion of the House of People’s Representative regarding the 
assumption of violation by the President and/or the Vice President according the 
Constitution. The extension of scope of authority of the Constitutional Court 
may also create problems because the justices have faced heavier processes of 
trial and longer duration of trial.46 Moreover, there was no integrated schedule 
of local election with other election institutions.47
Based on the historical background of the establishment of the Constitutional 
Court, handling the local election disputes is not a part of the authority of 
the Constitutional Court. In Article 22E of the 1945 Constitution states that 
general election shall be conducted to elect the members of DPR, the Regional 
Representative Council, the President and the Vice-President, and the Regional 
House of Representatives. The article states clearly that the local election in term 
of electing the Governor, Mayor and Regent are not the part of the authority of 
the Constitutional Court. In other words, the historical background shows that the 
Constitutional Court was designed to be the guardian of the Constitution which 
focuses on four authorities and one obligation as discussed in the previous chapter.
However lack of public trust on one hand to the Supreme Court and having 
strong public trust to the new Constitutional Court has encouraged the House 
of Representatives to enact law which gives mandate to the Constitutional Court 
to handle the local election disputes by extending the meaning of the local 
election as a part of the general election regime.48 Adding the authority with 
the local election disputes has made the Constitutional Court become an organ 
with too much too exaggerated.
46 Reƪy Harun argues that the root of problems of ineơectiveness of the Constitutional Court in settling disputes over the result of 
local election started from the extension of authority of the Constitutional Court on the objects of the disputes. If the Constitu-
tional Court did not extend the objects of disputes, the Constitutional Court would be able to settle the disputes over the result 
of local election fast and eơectively since it focuses on whether the recapitulation of votes is right or not and the applicant has 
to prove their claims.
47 See further Achmad Sodiki, “Demokrasi Lokal: Evaluasi Pemilukada di Indonesia”, at 44.  In this article, Achmad Sodiki argues 
that the problem of local election has to be analyzed with holistic dan integrated approaches.
48 See General Election Act 2007. In Article 1 (4), it is stated that “General election for Head of Local Government is general elec-
tion for electing directly the Head of the local government in the unitary system of Indonesia based on Pancasila and the 1945 
Constitution”.
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On contrary, I Gede Dewa Palguna, a constitutional law expert from Udayana 
University, Bali, argues that the Constitutional Court is better free from the 
authority to handle local election disputes. He adds that the Constitutional Court 
is better focuses on its main function in constitutional review. The Constitutional 
Court is better to have the authority to handle constitutional complaint as the 
closest and direct derivation of constitutional review.49 On the other hand, 
Ni’matul Huda, a constitutional law expert from Indonesian Islamic University, 
Yogyakarta and Aidul Fitriciada, a constitutional law expert from Universitas 
Muhammadiyah Surakarta argue that it will be better if the local election disputes 
are part of the authority of the Supreme Court through the High Court because 
it will be more eơective, eƥcient and cheap50.
3. Procedures
The third is procedural matters. Trial of the local election disputes is a 
speedy trial because the Constitutional Court has to decide the disputes within 
14 days from registration. This is one of the fastest trials of local election disputes 
compared to other countries such as Nigeria, Mexico, Brazil and Thailand.51 This is 
one of the main problems that create high tension of working at the Constitutional 
Court. A centralized model of the Constitutional Court with only 9 justices is 
not appropriate for settling huge number of local election disputes in Indonesia.
In addition, the short period of settlement of local election disputes is a 
weakness in the procedure. Fourteen days are not enough for the Constitutional 
Court in settling disputes of local elections since the Constitutional Court also 
tries and decides disputes on administrative disputes and criminal violations of 
election. Furthermore, data of local election shows that almost 85 percent of 
the local election brought to the Constitutional Court.
Data at the Constitutional Court shows that on August 2010, in particular 
days, the Justices had to Ƥnish the sessions from morning until evening (09.00 
am-23 pm). This data is the sessions at the Constitutional Court without local 
49  From Interview with Dr. I Dewa Gede Palguna on 18 November 2012.
50  From interview with Dr. Ni’matul Huda and Dr. Aidul Fitriciada on 12 November 2012.
51 In Nigeria and Mexico, the Election Tribunal has 180 days for local election disputes settlement at region level and 90 day for ap-
peal. In Brazil, the Election Commission has 90 days for local election disputes settlement at region level and 90 days for appeal. 
Thailand allocates 30 days for local election disputes settlement.
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elections which are conducted at the same time. It is predicted that if the sessions 
were conducted from morning until evening, it will inƪuence the quality of 
the session since the justices might be tired already. As the result, it will also 
inƪuence the quality of decisions of the Justices.52
It is worthy to note that duration of 14 days for Ƥnishing a local election 
dispute is actually design of duration for the general election whereby the local 
election is not a part of the general election regime. Obviously, the drafter of Act 
and Regulation do not adapt this duration of time even after the local elections 
inserted as the part of the general election.53
4. Code of Ethics. 
With the spirit as the guardian of the Constitution and vision of upholding 
Constitution in order to realize the rule of law state and democracy in the light 
of creating a civilized national life, the Constitutional Court has emerged as a 
new hope in the practice of constitutional system. This vision is becoming a 
guideline for the Constitutional Court in performing its duty as judiciary organ 
which is independent and responsible in accordance with the 1945 Constitution.54
Many comments have appreciated the Constitutional Court as a new state 
organ which inspires the milieu of the practice of the state into a new tradition 
of checks and balances. As it has been recorded in the previous chapter, the 
Constitutional Court has been considered as the rising star in the life of the 
country since it has shown its reputable achievements in keeping the balance of 
powers between state and the citizens. One of the strengths of the Constitutional 
Court lies in its strong management and leadership and the integrity of the 
justices and the staơs who should be hand in hand in building the Constitutional 
Court to become a modern and trustable court. This very good achievement 
and reputable institution could be maintained smoothly by the Constitutional 
Court until October 2013.
52 Interview with Dr. I Dewa Gede Palguna from Udayana University, Bali on 12 November 2012.
53 Compare to some countries such as Nigeria and Mexico, the Election Tribunal has 180 days for local election disputes settlement 
at region level and 90 day for appeal. In Brazil, the Election Commission has 90 days for local election disputes settlement at 
region level and 90 days for appeal. Thailand allocates 30 days for local election disputes settlement. Those countries have more 
time to Ƥnish their local election disputes. In the case of Indonesia with huge number of population as well as the character of 
geography which long and consists of many islands, the duration of time for local election disputes settlement should be longer.
54 Prakata dalam homepage Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/ viewed on March, 4th, 
2014 
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On 2 October 2013, it was surprisingly news made by media when the 
chairman of the Constitutional Court, Akil Mochtar, was caught red-handed in 
his oƥcial house in his involvement in a bribery case. This is really a disaster for 
the Indonesian legal system at all since the Constitutional Court is expected as 
the agent of change in the very dark image of the court and the legal apparatus 
in Indonesia. The authority of the Constitutional Court is suddenly deteriorating 
and public trust started disappearing.
One of the loopholes that lead the Constitutional Court to a dangerous 
situation since the system as well as public placed too much reliance on integrity 
of the justices in the Constitutional Court. Even though, the Constitutional 
Court has set out a code of ethics in 2004, however this internal supervision 
is nothing when the justices or the chairman of the Constitutional Court are a 
part of the problem. Human beings are sometimes weak to supervise themselves. 
Therefore, in many areas, it is developed two kinds of supervision; internal and 
external supervision.
In 2006, the Judicial Commission was the external supervision which had 
authority to supervise the justices of the Constitutional Court. However, the 
Constitutional Court nulliƤed the authority of the Judicial Commission in 
supervising the justices of the Constitutional Court through its decision in 2006. 
Hence, as a new state organs, the Constitutional Court tends to be a super body 
institution without strong supervision either internally or externally. Without 
having strong supervision, the code of ethics of the judges may not be enforced 
well. Internal supervision becomes weak when the problems lies in the hands 
of judges of the Constitutional Court. One of the result of this situation was in 
2014, Akil Mochtar, the chairman of the Constitutional Court was arrested by the 
Anti-Corruption Commission on bribery case relating to local election in Borneo.
In short, the individual piety is not enough without having strong supervision 
and broader contribution of social control. Code of ethics is nothing without 
having strong supervision of both internal and external supervision. In addition, 
in relating to the Constitutional Court, social control is also needed.
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III. CONCLUSION
The Constitutional Court, through its decisions, has created a more conducive 
political situation and has given signiƤcant contributions in the process of 
consolidating local democracy in Indonesia. The Court managed to settle all 
disputes regarding local elections disputes assigned to them so far although it 
has limited number of judges and short period of settlement of the disputes. 
However, from managerial aspect and litigant interest, the local election disputes 
settlement worked ineơectively. Ineơectiveness of the settlement are caused by 
factors such as problem of design of structure of the Court, extension of the 
scope of authority, short period of settlement of disputes, and the breach of 
code of ethics of the judges.The assignment of jurisdiction to the constitutional 
court to deal with local election disputes unfortunately has negative impact on 
the  function of the Court as the guardian of the Constitutional Court through 
judicial review mechanism due to logistic and lack of manpower. Therefore, 
re-design of structure as well as the authority of the Constitutional Court are 
necessarily needed. In addition, the Constitutional Court needs to have a more 
eơective supervisory organ which may enforce the code of ethics of judges.
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